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Abstract
We build a general equilibrium model of a small open economy, with the
purpose of analyzing the eﬀects of a countercyclical rule-based ﬁscal regime,
which corresponds to a stylized version of the structural balance in place in
Chile. The economy exports a domestically-produced good and one natural
resource (commodity), which is partly state-owned, generating income to the
government. We analyze how shocks are transmitted to the economy in the
presence of this ﬁscal rule by introducing shocks to government spending,
taxes, and the price of the natural resource. In the last shock, we compare
our structural rule with a case where the budget is always balanced. The
results make a strong case for the adoption of the latter in other commodity-
exporting economies.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, E62, H41, F61.
Keywords: open economy, ﬁscal policy, rule of thumb consumers, gov-
ernment spending.
∗Carlos García is professor at ILADES-Georgetown, Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Jorge E.
Restrepo works for the Central Bank of Chile. We thank Rodrigo Valdés, Rafael Bergoeing and
participants in seminars at Ilades, Universidad de Chile FACEA, and CEA for comments. We
also thank William Baeza for his help with a code used in the sensibility analyses, and Consuelo
Edwards for her help with the edition. The authors are solely responsible for the opinions herein.
E-mail addresses: cgarcia@uahurtado.cl and jrestrepo@bcentral.cl
11 Introduction
Advances in business cycle theory include New Keynesian models, which allow a
better understanding of macroeconomics in the presence of market imperfections
i.e. monopolistic competition, sticky prices, and credit rationed (rule-of-thumb)
consumers.1 The great bulk of this literature has concentrated on analyzing the
eﬀects of monetary policy on inﬂation and aggregate economic activity, including
among many issues: monetary shocks, Taylor rules, and uncertainty. Recently, the
literature is also making quick progress regarding ﬁscal policy, which also includes
questions of great importance to macroeconomics. Indeed, understanding the trans-
mission to the economy of changes in ﬁscal policy is a requirement for policy-makers
everywhere.
We build a general equilibrium model of a small open economy, with the purpose
of analyzing the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.2 The model includes lump-sum taxes, rule-
of-thumb consumers, staggered prices and wages as well as a standard Taylor-type
monetary rule.3 The economy exports a domestically-produced good and a natural
resource, which could be a commodity (e.g., copper, oil, coal or iron), and is partly
state-owned, generating income to the government. The other part of this resource
is privately owned and generates income that does not enter the country. This is
actually the case of many small open economies, where the business cycle, the real
exchange rate and the composition of GDP are strongly associated to the behavior
of the international price of a speciﬁcc o m m o d i t y . 4
Although ﬁscal policy can contribute to economic growth and welfare, ﬁscal dis-
equilibrium and excessive discretion can be very harmful for the economy. Indeed, it
can aﬀect negatively private sector’s expectations and planning horizon and the way
ﬁnancial markets function. Since ﬁscal authorities must allocate public resources,
there is an inherent bias towards increasing public spending and delaying ﬁscal ad-
justment, known as the time inconsistency bias in the sense of Kidland and Prescott
(1977). Such type of behavior arises because: i) authorities desire to obtain polit-
1This type of consumer is also called hand-to-mouth.
2This paper was originally part of a project to build a large Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium Model for the Chilean economy, which is still in progress at the Central Bank of Chile
(Medina and Soto, 2006).
3Rigid wages are at the heart of New Keynesian models and they have been documented for
many economies (Blanchard and Galí, 2005, Cuckierman, 2005).
4For instance, the price of copper has historically played a crucial role in the performance of the
Chilean economy. On the other hand, Venezuela and Ecuador depend on the price of oil. These
are only a few examples of a much longer list. Figure 1 shows the main product as share of total
exports in a group Latin American and Caribbean countries (Jiménez and Tromben, 2006).
2ical dividends in the short run, leading to overspending and accumulation of debt
(Alesina and Tabellini, 1990); ii) the budgetary process also suﬀers the tragedy of
the commons because it consists of the distribution of resources with no speciﬁc
owner. Since they belong to the public, each area of government tries to obtain
as much as possible to spend on their preferred projects. By the same token, the
members of a coalition frequently try to block any ﬁscal reform to avoid the polit-
ical costs of its implementation (Velasco, 1994). Eventually, ﬁscal policy ends up
being procyclical because adjustment is ﬁnally imposed by creditors in the midst of
a crisis.5
As a matter of fact, procyclical ﬁscal policy in developing countries has been
the rule rather than the exception (Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004; Talvi and
Vegh, 2005). In practice, during expansions, government consumption increases and
taxes fall, while the opposite is true during recessions. Furthermore, the inﬂation
tax is also low in expansions and high in recessions. Hence, ﬁscal policy in those
countries appears to diﬀer substantially with respect to OECD countries.6
Establishing ﬁscal rules corresponds to an institutional solution to the time incon-
sistency problem guaranteeing ﬁscal equilibrium. Ideally, such rules should include
automatic business cycle stabilizers making ﬁscal policy consistent with arguments
in favor of smoothing public spending and taxes (Barro, 1979) as well as with tra-
ditional Keynesian proposal of counteracting costly economic ﬂuctuations. This
is precisely the case of the Chilean ﬁscal rule. Indeed, in 2001 the Chilean ﬁscal
authority established that spending will be adjusted to meet the goal of a 1% struc-
tural surplus. "Structural" refers here to trend tax revenues, which are associated
with trend GDP growth and the long-run price of copper. If GDP is growing less
than its trend, government spending will be larger than its revenues, resulting in
a countercyclical ﬁscal deﬁcit. Thus, spending will grow with trend GDP, given
its gradual reaction to structural revenues and/or to any deviation from the 1%
structural surplus.7
This is why our model also includes a ﬁscal rule that represents a stylized version
of the structural-surplus rule in place in Chile since 2001. Given that this is a
5Gavin et al. (1996) and Gavin and Perotti (1997) have attributed this procyclical bias to the
fact that developing countries are rationed from international credit markets in bad times.
6Talvi, E. and C. Vegh (2005) argue that pressures to increase public spending in countries that
face large ﬂuctuations in the tax base, as is the case of many developing countries, are the cause
behind running an optimal procyclical ﬁscal policy.
7The target of a 1% structural surplus was set to cover the Central Bank’s deﬁcit and future
pension liabilities.
3business cycle model, our steady-state ﬁscal balance corresponds to the structural
one. Without loss of generality, instead of using a 1% surplus in steady state, we
work in the model with a balanced steady-state (structural) ﬁscal budget. As a
result, with our rule, spending moves with structural tax revenues (steady state)
and slowly reacts to any deviation from ﬁscal balance, making the ﬁscal deﬁcit also
countercyclical.8
In order to analyze the transmission of the shocks to the economy with the
ﬁscal rule, we carry out several experiments by introducing shocks to government
spending, taxes, and the price of the natural resource. The spending shock results
in increased consumption, GDP, real wages and imports. At the same time, there
is currency appreciation. Therefore, exports of the domestically-produced good
and the current account decline.9 The latter is a standard result of open-economy
models with ﬂexible exchange rates, where net exports decrease as a consequence
of public spending. Finally, due to the spending hike, inﬂation increases, as do
the nominal and real interest rates, resulting in lower investment. These results
are consistent with the traditional Mundell-Fleming (IS-LM) model and with recent
micro and macro evidence on the subject for the US and other OECD countries. A
non exhaustive list of recent studies include Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Mankiw
(2000); Perotti (2002); Galí et al.(2005); Mountford and Uhlig (2002); Fatás and
Mihov (2001) and Ramey and Shapiro (1998). On the other hand, Restrepo and
Rincón (2005) perform empirical estimations for two developing economies.
In the standard RBC model, which only has Ricardian agents, an increase in
government spending reduces after-tax lifetime income and consumption. In our
m o d e l ,o nt h ec o n t r a r y ,t h e r ei sas h a r eo fc o n s u m e r sw h o s ed e c i s i o n sd e p e n do n
current disposable income. Given the wealth and income distribution prevalent
in the US, as well as in many countries, a share of households do no save and
cannot borrow (Jaﬀee and Stiglitz, 1990; Mankiw, 2000). Hence, they cannot smooth
consumption when income ﬂuctuates or change the intertemporal consumption path
when the interest rate moves. In this case, real wages respond positively to the
spending hike, which improves rule-of-thumbers income compensating the negative
wealth eﬀect suﬀered by optimizing agents.
8For a comparison of three diﬀerent ﬁscal rules, see García and Restrepo (2005).
9The impact of the shock on consumption and GDP grows with the share of rule-of-thumb
consumers and domestic goods in the government’s basket. On the other hand, the more aggressive
the central bank in ﬁghting inﬂation, the smaller the impact of the government spending shock on
consumption and GDP, and the more negative the impact on investment (García and Restrepo,
2005).
4The shock on lump-sum taxes has opposite eﬀects. Consumption drops, and so
do GDP, imports, the real wage, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit. Similarly, inﬂation decreases
jointly with the nominal and real interest rates, driving investment upwards. The
real exchange rate goes up with exports and the current account.
The third shock corresponds to an increase in the price of the natural resource. It
is assumed that in the short run its supply is given and will not increase in response
to the higher price. The larger the share of the income coming from the natural
resource that is brought into the country, the stronger the impact on the economy
of a shock to its price: GDP, consumption, investment, and wages increase. On
the other hand, the currency appreciates and exports of the domestically-produced
good fall. In other words, the higher price of the natural resource generates the
well-known Dutch disease. However, in comparison to the outcome using an always
balanced budget, the latter eﬀect is almost negligible, thanks to the structural ﬁscal
rule, which is strongly countercyclical, saving the windfall and avoiding most the un-
desired currency appreciation and reduction of exports of the domestically-produced
good. These results make a good case for implementing such type of rule in other
small open commodity-exporting economies.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 dis-
cusses the calibration of the parameters and analyzes the models’ dynamics towards
equilibrium when each shock hits the economy. Finally, section 4 summarizes the
results and concludes.
2M o d e l
The economy corresponds to a business cycle model, which has a continuum of house-
holds and ﬁrms engaged in monopolistic competition, staggered prices and monetary
(central bank) and ﬁscal authorities. Therefore, it is close to the so-called New Key-
nesian literature (Rotemberg and Woodford,1992, Clarida, Galí and Gertler,1999,
Smets and Wouters, 2002). In particular, we follow Galí et al. (2005) by including
the two types of households: optimizers (Ricardian) and rule-of thumbers. We also
include staggered wages as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
2.1 Households
T h e r ei sac o n t i n u u mo fi n ﬁnitely lived households indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. A fraction
of households λ consume their current labor income, do not save, and cannot borrow
5i.e. they are credit restricted (rule-of-thumb consumers). Another fraction 1−λ save,
have access to capital markets, and are able to smooth consumption. Therefore, their
intertemporal allocation between consumption and savings is optimal (Ricardian or
optimizing consumers).
2.1.1 Ricardian households


































t(i) is consumption, Do
t(i) are dividends from ownership of ﬁrms, Φ(B∗
t)
represents the country risk premium, St is the nominal exchange rate, B∗
t(i) denotes
private net foreign assets, Wt is nominal wage, No
t (i) is the number of hours of
work, Bo
t(i) is government debt held by households, Rt is the gross nominal return
on assets, and Tt(i) are lump-sum taxes.








where 1/σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and
ϕ is the elasticity of marginal disutility to labor supply.10








































10In our baseline calibration we assume σ =1 .Therefore, the utility function becomes: log(C)−
(N1+ϕ)/(1 + ϕ).
6where et is the nominal exchange rate.
We have not included the ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply because, follow-
ing Galí et al. (2005), we assume that hours are chosen by ﬁrms. On the other
hand, households supply the labor required because wages remain always above the
marginal rate of substitution, given that workers have some market power.
2.1.2 Rule-of-thumb households





t (i)).( 5 )
We assume that these households do no save and cannot borrow (Mankiw, 2000).





t (i) − PtTt.( 6 )
2.1.3 The wage schedule
We suppose –as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000)– that households act as
price-setters in the labor market.11 Since wages are staggered à la Calvo (1983), they
can only be optimally changed after some random "signal" is received. A continuum
of monopolistically competitive households supply a diﬀerentiated labor service to
the intermediate-goods-producing sector and a labor aggregator combines as much
household-labor asi sd e m a n d e db yﬁrms, with a constant-returns technology. The









where Nt(i) is the quantity of labor used from each household.
The representative labor aggregator minimizes the cost of producing a chosen
amount of the aggregate labor index, given each household’s wage rate Wt(i). Then,
she sells units of labor index at their unit cost Wt (with no proﬁt), to the production
sector:
11Other alternative consists of modeling the labor market as in Galí et al. (2005) where real
wages are determined with a general function, H, which is increasing in both consumption and
employment Wt









Thus, nominal wages are set by the households to maximize their intertemporal
objective function (1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2) and to the








Wages of rule-of-thumb households are set at the average wage level of optimizing
households.
2.1.4 Demand for domestic and imported consumption goods




















There is a demand for each set of diﬀerentiated domestic and imported goods,



































.( 1 3 )
A weighted average of a bundle of either domestic or imported diﬀerentiated







































for K = D,F.
2.2 Domestic intermediate-goods ﬁrms
We assume the existence of a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, in-
dexed by j ∈ [0,1], producing diﬀerentiated intermediate goods.
2.2.1 Cost minimization
The production function of the representative intermediate-good ﬁrm, indexed by j,
corresponds to a CES combination of capital, Kt, and labor, Nt, to produce Yt (j),















where At, the technology parameter, and σs, the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor, are both ≥ 0.
The ﬁrms’ costs are minimized taking as given the rental price of capital, Rk
t,
and the wage, Wt, subject to the production function (technology). The relative





























1−σs .( 1 9 )
2.2.2 Price setting
When ﬁrm j receives a signal to optimally set a new price à la Calvo (1983), it max-



































































Firms that did not receive the signal cannot adjust their prices and those that
are allowed to optimally reset their prices choose the same price PD∗
t . Thus, the
dynamics of the domestic price index PD


















2.3 Intermediate-goods importing ﬁrms
This sector consists of ﬁrms that import a homogenous good produced abroad and
turn it into a diﬀerentiated foreign good for the home market using a linear pro-
duction technology. Import ﬁrms are only allowed to change their price when they
receive a random price-change signal. Thus, the dynamics of the import price index
is also described by an equation similar to (24) but, in this case, the ﬁrms that
are allowed to reset their prices respond to variations in the exchange rate or the
foreign price and choose as their optimal price the import price abroad expressed in
domestic currency StPF∗


















It is worth pointing out that exchange rate pass-through here is partial.
2.4 Optimizing investment ﬁrms
There are ﬁrms that produce homogenous capital goods and rent them to the
intermediate-goods ﬁrms. Note that only the Ricardian households own them.
102.4.1 Tobin’s Q





















subject to capital accumulation equation, which includes adjustment costs:
K
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Equation (29) corresponds to Tobin’s Q, which in words states that the marginal
cost of an additional unit of investment should be equal to the present value of the
marginal increase in equity that it generates.
2.4.2 Demand for investment goods



















The respective demands for domestic and imported investment goods are derived


































































for K = D,F.





































Since only Ricardian households invest and accumulate capital, total investment
is equal to (1 − λ) times optimizing investment:
It =( 1− λ)(I
o
t ). (37)
By the same token, the aggregate capital stock is equal to:
Kt =( 1− λ)(K
o
t). (38)
Again, only optimizing households hold ﬁnancial assets:
Bt =( 1− λ)(B
o
t). (39)
Foreign assets (or debt) includes ﬁscal BG∗






t +( 1− λ)B
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The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to the following rule:
rt = r + φππt + φyyrt (43)
with r being the neutral or steady state nominal interest rate and yrt standing
for GDP without the natural resource. The coeﬃcient on inﬂation is φπ ≥ 1. Since
φyr =0in our baseline calibration, this rule is a particular case of the well-known
Taylor rule, in which authorities do not include the output gap.
2.6 Fiscal policy























where tau_cu is the share of the production of the natural resource owned by the
government. Pcu
t denotes its international price and Q_cu is the amount produced
(supplied), which is ﬁxed. Indeed, we assume that in the short run the supply
of the natural resource is limited, and will not increase in response to the higher
international price.
Φ(B∗
t) represents the country-risk premium, BG
t denotes public domestic as-
sets (debt), R∗
t is the gross nominal return on foreign assets, PtTt corresponds to
government nominal (lump-sum) tax revenues, and PG
t Gt is public spending. For
13simplicity, we assume that the government maintains a ﬁxed proportion of domestic
and external debt: StBG∗
t = υbBt.
The ﬁscal rule establishes that public spending should be equal to steady-state
(structural) government revenues IT less interest payments:
P
G












Under this rule, the government adjusts spending, instead of taxes, to go back
to equilibrium, whenever it faces a debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal deﬁcit. In the meantime, the
level of debt will grow up to the point where revenues and expenditures equilibrate
again. This new level of debt will remain forever unless there is a shock that takes
it to an even higher level or that increases revenues and allows the government
to run transitory surpluses and reduce its outstanding debt. In other words, the
government debt follows a random walk (Restrepo, 2005). Therefore, we cannot
use such a rule because the model would not converge. For that reason, we allow
the debt to have some weight in the rule µx =0 .001, so the government has to
pay a little more than the interest on its debt to slowly amortize the principal and
converge back to the steady-state level.
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Finally, as a way of introducing shocks to the level of the tax rate, we suppose
that after the shock it follows an autoregressive process:
τt = ρττt−1 + u
t
t. (47)
2.6.1 Government demand for domestic and imported goods



















The demands for domestic and imported goods derived from expenditure mini-


































































for K = D,F.
2.7 Market-clearing conditions































The supply of domestic goods equals the sum of consumption, investment, gov-












Finally, the economy equilibrium can be expressed as:
15PtCt = −P
G
t Gt − P
I






































3 Calibration and Dynamics
The model is linearized (see the appendix), then the system of stochastic diﬀerence
equations is solved with Dynare (Julliard, 2003).12
We show most of the parameters used in our calibration (Table 1).13 For instance,
the discount factor β is 0.99, which is a standard ﬁg u r ef o u n di nt h el i t e r a t u r e .
The risk aversion coeﬃcient in the consumption function is 1. The elasticity of
substitution across intermediate goods is ε=6, and the rate of depreciation δ is
0.02. Half of the households are rule-of-thumbers. Whenever there is public debt,







0.21. The share of domestic goods in the government basket of consumption is
αG=0.99. In our baseline simulation, the size of the coeﬃcient in the monetary rule
with respect to inﬂation φπ i se q u a lt o1 . 5 ,a n dw i t hr e s p e c tt oo u t p u tφyr is 0. In
our steady state, consumption is 63% of GDP, government spending is 20%, and
given that the overall government budget is assumed to be balanced, tax revenues
are also 20% (Restrepo and Soto, 2004). This is equivalent to assuming structural
balance instead of the structural surplus adopted in Chile, without loss of generality.
The ratio of exports to GDP is 34%, investment is 16%, while imports are slightly
less than that 33%, given that the trade surplus covers the steady-state interest
payments on a 50% of GDP level of foreign private debt (table2).
3.0.1 Eﬀects of shocks
We report in this section the results of the experiments performed with the artiﬁcial
small open economy14.
12The software is available at: http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare.
13We assume that each period corresponds to one quarter.
14The line with crosses corresponds to the baseline calibration in all the ﬁgures.
16Fiscal spending shock We show in ﬁgure 2 the responses of a large set of
variables (18) to a government spending shock. Each response includes three lines,
w h i c hc o r r e s p o n dt oad i ﬀerent share of rule-of-thumb households in the economy
(λ). When λ is smaller, the results are closer to the ones that would be obtained
by the standard real business cycle (RBC) model, which only has Ricardian house-
holds. The diﬀerence is that here prices are rigid. On the contrary, with a large
share of rule-of-thumb agents (λ=0.5), the debt-ﬁnanced spending shock results in
increased consumption, GDP, hours of work, real wages and imports. The trans-
mission mechanism of the shock works through higher real wages, which improves
rule-of-thumbers’ income compensating the negative wealth eﬀect suﬀered by op-
timizing agents. The larger domestic demand drives up inﬂation and the real and
nominal interest rates with a negative impact on investment. On the other hand,
the currency appreciates, imports go up, while exports of the domestically-produced
good decrease. The resulting current account deﬁcit translates into a build-up of
foreign debt. Even though we did not include the risk premium in the ﬁgure, it
increases with debt.
The positive eﬀect on consumption and GDP is consistent not only with the
traditional IS-LM model (Blanchard, 2001) but also with recent macro evidence.
Similarly, the decline of the exchange rate and the current account is in line with the
traditional Mundell-Fleming model, where net exports decrease as a consequence of
public spending, in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The composition of GDP and/or
aggregate demand changes as a result of the shock.
In ﬁgure 3, we include the responses of the variables to the same shock (with
λ always being equal to =0.5), when the composition of domestic goods in the
government consumption basket changes. The larger the share of domestic goods,
the stronger the positive impact on consumption, GDP, hours of work, real wages,
and the rental price of capital as well as on inﬂation, and the nominal and real
interest rates. By the same token, the appreciation of the currency and the fall of
the amount exported of the domestically-produced good are also larger.
Lump-sum tax shock The shock on lump-sum taxes has opposite eﬀects to the
ones observed when the economy is hit by an increase in government spending. As is
shown in ﬁgure 4, consumption drops as well as GDP, imports, hours of work, real
wages, the rental price of capital and the ﬁscal deﬁcit. Similarly, inﬂation decreases
jointly with the nominal and real interest rates, driving investment upwards. The
real exchange rate goes up with exports of the domestically-produced good and
17the current account generates a surplus reducing foreign debt. Finally, the ﬁscal
deﬁcit narrows as expected. It is worth pointing out that in the case of a very
low share of rule-of-thumb households (small λ), the eﬀect of the shock on most
variables is almost negligible. Figure 5 includes the responses of the variables to
the tax shock when the composition of the government’s consumption basket varies.
In this case, the fall in consumption, real wages and the rental price of capital is
smaller if the government spends more on domestic goods. Similarly, investment
grows more. In addition, the real exchange rate increases less when the government
spends more domestically. Finally, inﬂation and both interest rates fall more after
the tax shock with a larger share of domestically-produced goods included in the
government consumption basket.
Natural resource shock The last shock consists of an increase in the interna-
tional price of the natural resource sold abroad. Its supply is assumed to be given
in the short run, and will not respond to the higher price. The larger the share
of the natural resource income that is brought into the country, the stronger the
impact of the shock on the economy. Indeed, in ﬁgure 6 GDP, consumption, hours
of work, wages and the rental price of capital all increase. Consistently with the
countercyclical nature of the ﬁscal rule, the government deﬁcit falls. On the other
hand, the currency appreciates, imports go up, and exports of the domestically-
produced good fall. In other words, higher prices of the natural resource generate
the well-known Dutch disease. Finally, the appreciation of the currency slightly
reduces inﬂation (exchange rate pass through), and also reduces both interest rates,
given the monetary rule. The latter eﬀect drives investment upwards.
The most important results are included in ﬁgure 7, where each small chart
has two lines. The dotted line was obtained with a rule where the government’s
budget is balanced at all times. The line with crosses represents the responses
o ft h ev a r i a b l e st ot h es a m es h o c ki no u rb a s e l i n em o d e l( C h i l e a nﬁscal rule). The
countercyclical nature of the rule is evident. In both cases government revenues show
the same jump at impact. However in our baseline model GDP and consumption
only increase marginally because most resources are saved, which is reﬂected in
ad r o po ft h eﬁscal deﬁcit. That is why government expenditure remains almost
constant. Hence, the real exchange rate shows a very modest reduction and so
do inﬂation, and interest rates. The latter eﬀect pushes investment up. On the
contrary the balanced-budget rule is strongly procyclical: government expenditures
grow jointly with revenues fueling the economy. Therefore, output, consumption
18and hours also increase. The appreciation of the currency is larger causing a jump
in imports and a larger reduction in exports of the domestically-produced good than
before. In this case, inﬂation and both interest rates go up dampening investment.
A drop in the price of the natural resource would have the opposite eﬀects. The
balanced-budget rule would accentuate its negative impact on GDP, consumption
and other variables while our baseline ﬁscal regime would avoid most of the undesired
eﬀects. In ﬁgure 8, we increased the persistence of the shock from 0,7 to 0,9. The
more persistent is the shock to the price of the natural resource, the larger is the
real exchange rate fall (appreciation). In both cases the appreciation of the currency
with the balanced budget is almost double than with the rule of structural balance.
In the case of a near permanent shock the drop of the real exchange rate gets close
to 20% of the copper price hike, and the diﬀerence between both rules decreases
because additional revenues are quasi-permanent or quasi-structural (table 3).
4 Summary and Conclusions
We have built a general equilibrium model of a small open economy, with the purpose
of analyzing the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. The model includes lump-sum taxes, rule-
of-thumb consumers, sticky prices, and staggered wages. The economy exports a
domestically-produced good and one natural resource, which is partly owned by the
government. The other part of this resource belongs to the private sector and never
enters the country. The model also has a standard Taylor-type monetary rule and a
ﬁscal rule that represents a stylized version of the structural surplus in place in Chile
during the last ﬁve years. With this rule, the ﬁscal deﬁcit is countercyclical, given
that spending should be in line with structural revenues (trend tax revenues), and
it slowly reacts to any deviation from ﬁscal balance. We assumed that our steady-
state ﬁscal balance corresponded to the structural one. We introduced shocks to
government spending, taxes, and the price of the natural resource. In general,
we conclude that the results obtained with the experiments are very intuitive and
consistent with both common economic wisdom and empirical evidence.
The spending shock resulted in increased consumption, GDP, real wages and
imports. In this case, real wages responded positively to the larger spending, which
improved rule-of-thumbers’ income, thus compensating the negative wealth eﬀect
suﬀered by optimizing agents. Therefore, the impact of the shock on consumption
and GDP grows with the share of rule-of-thumb consumers and domestic goods in
19the government basket. At the same time, the currency appreciated, exports of the
domestically-produced good fell and the current account decreased. These results
are consistent with the traditional Mundell-Fleming model (IS-LM-BP) and also
with recent macro evidence. Finally, the increase in government spending fueled
inﬂation and pushed the nominal and real interest rates up, aﬀecting investment
negatively.
The shock on lump-sum taxes had opposite eﬀects. Consumption dropped, as
did GDP, imports, real wages, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit. Similarly, inﬂation fell jointly
with the nominal and real interest rates, driving investment upwards. The real
exchange rate went up with exports and the current account.
The last shock analyzed consisted of an increase in the price of the natural
resource. The results coincided with common wisdom: GDP, consumption, invest-
ment, and wages increased. On the other side, exports of the domestically-produced
good fell due to appreciation of the currency. In other words, higher prices of the
natural resource generated the well-known Dutch disease. However, the magnitude
of the eﬀect was negligible. Indeed, when compared with a rule that keeps the
budget always balanced, it is evident that our baseline ﬁscal rule is strongly coun-
tercyclical, saving most of the windfall and avoiding most of the undesired currency
appreciation and reduction of exports of the domestically-produced good. In con-
clusion, the ﬁscal rule included in our baseline model, which captures the spirit of
the Chilean ﬁscal regime, also has the ability to smooth the cycles due to shocks to
the price of the natural resource exported by the small economy, making the case
for its adoption in similar commodity-exporting economies very strong.
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6 Appendix: Linearized Model
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Production function of intermediate domestic good
yt = a + ϕckt +( 1− ϕc)nt
Parity condition
rt − πt+1 =
³
(st+1 − pt+1) − (st − pt)+r
∗
t + ρb Φt
´
24Real interest rate (ex-ante)
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Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule
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277T a b l e s
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
Discount factor β 0.99
Risk aversion coeﬃcient σ 1.00
Weight of rule-of-thumb consumers λ 0.50
Rate of depreciation δ 0.02
Elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin’s Q η 1.00
Mark-up (intermediate goods) i = D,F ( εi
εi−1) 1.20
Parameter of CES production function α 0.33
Fraction of ﬁrms that keep their prices unchanged θD,θ F 0.75
Fraction of wages that remain unchanged ξw 0.75
Labor Market Mark-up 1+θw 1.20
Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor σs 1.00
Response of monetary authority to inﬂation φπ 1.50
Response of monetary authority to yr (demand determined) φyr 0.00
Autoregressive coeﬃcient of government expenditure shock ρG 0.90
Autoregressive coeﬃcient of lump-sum taxes shock ρu 0.90
Autoregressive coeﬃcient of copper price ρcu 0.70
Weight of domestic good in consumption αc 0.70
Weight of domestic good in investment αI 0.50
Weight of domestic good in government expenditure αG 0.99
Foreign-domestic good (consumption) elasticity of substitution ηC 0.99
Foreign-domestic good (investment) elasticity of substitution ηI 0.99
Foreign-domestic good (government) elasticity of substitution ηG 0.99






Inverse of work eﬀort elasticity with respect to real wage ϕ 0.20
Table 2: Steady State Values
Consumption / output ratio C
Y 0.63
External debt / output ratio B∗
Y 0.50
Investment / output ratio I
Y 0.16
Export / output ratio X
Y 0.34
Import / output ratio Y F
Y 0.33
Government expending / output ratio G
Y 0.20
N. Resource Production / GDP ratio
Qcu
Y 0.08
Table 3: Impact of a (1%) Shock to the Price of Copper on the RER (%)*
(With diﬀerent persistence values)
Structural rule Balanced budget
(Cyclically adjusted)
Temporary shock (rho=0.7) -0.0133 -0.025
Temporary shock (rho=0.93) -0.04 -0.09
Temporary shock (rho=0.99) -0.14 -0.18
*Rho the autocorrelation coeﬃcient between 1973-2005 is 0.93
288F i g u r e s




























































Source: Jiménez and Tromben (2006)
29Figure 2: Shock to Government Spending with Diﬀerent Shares of Rule-of-thumb
Consumers
 







































































































30Figure 3: Shock to Government Spending with Diﬀerent Shares of Domestic Goods
in the Government’s Consumption Basket
 







































































































31Figure 4: Shock to Taxes with Diﬀerent Shares of Rule-of-thumb Consumers (λ)
 



































































































32Figure 5: Shock to Taxes with Diﬀerent Shares of Domestic Goods in the Govern-
ment’s Consumption Basket
 







































































































33Figure 6: Shock to the Price of the Natural-Resource with Diﬀerent Shares of its
Property
 







































































































34Figure 7: Shock to the Natural Resource Price with two ﬁscal rules (baseline
calibration)
 








































































































35Figure 8: A More Persistent Shock to the Natural Resource Price with Two Fiscal
Rules
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